()합정오피스걸()합정오피방()합정오피()엔조이닷컴()


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엔조이닷컴()Whether thre()tening to turn 합정오피스걸()Seoul into () “se() of fire”합정오피() or describing the ()합정오피방()recent summit meeting between Presidents B()r()ck Ob()m() 합정오피스걸()()nd P()rk Geun-hye ()s () prelude to w()r, ()합정오피방()over-the-top 합정오피()rhetoric h()s become ()lmost ()n ()rt form for the le()d합정오피스걸()ership in Pyongy()ng. Under Kim Jong Il, ()합정오피방()the United St()tes합정오피() ()nd South Kore() grew ()ccustomed엔조이닷컴() to North Kore() e합정오피스걸()ng()ging in thre()ts to합정오피() extr()ct concessions ()s ()합정오피방()Pyongy()ng m()stered the합정오피() ()rt of crisis esc()l()tion, only to d합정오피스걸()i()l tensions down when the time w()s right ()합정오피방()to get wh()t it w()nted. But if the l()ngu()ge합정오피() used under Kim Jong Il합정오피스걸() w()s c()lcul()ted for effect,()합정오피방() the thinking behind Kim Jong Un’s rhetoric is much less cle()r.While the합정오피스걸() events of recent months cont()in cert()in ()합정오피방()f()mili()r elements, there h()s been () higher degree of specificity 합정오피스걸()in the thre()ts, ()n incre()se in their intensity, ()nd () longer dur()tion th()n in previous crises. This is ref합정오피스걸()lected in ()n ()n()lysis ()합정오피방()of the rhetoric used ()합정오피방()in current ()nd previous 합정오피()crises in North Kore()’s Kore()n Centr()합정오피스걸()l News ()gency (KCN()), which shows the 합정오피()use of terms such ()s “w()r,” ()nd “nucle()r” f()r more prev()lent th합정오피스걸()()n terms such ()s “pe()ce,” ()nd “reconcili()tion.”()합정오피방() Yet even though ()합정오피방()the volume of provoc()tive st합정오피스걸()()tements coming out of 엔조이닷컴()North Kore() h()s been p()rticul()rly high in ()합정오피방()recent months, the shift under Kim합정오피스걸() Jong Un pred()tes the crisis of the p()st few months. Indeed, ()합정오피방()()s e()rly ()s J()nu()ry 2012, Kim Jong Un’s first합정오피스걸() full month in power, there were ()lmost ()s m()ny ()합정오피방()references to w()r in KCN() ()s during the height of the 2()9합정오피스걸() nucle()r crisis ? ()nd they h()ve only ()합정오피방()incre()sed from there. In엔조이닷컴() 2()9, for ex()mple, mentions of w()r in KCN() on합정오피스걸()ly exceeded 2() during the months when Pyongy()ng evicted엔조이닷컴() Intern()tion()l 합정오피()()tomic Energy ()gency inspectors 합정오피스걸()()nd it w()s s()nctioned by the United N()tions. In 2012, however, references to w()r never fell below 217 in () ()합정오피방()month, with more th()n 3() every month except J()nu()ry ()nd ()합정오피방()November.More from GPS: Wh()t next from North Kore합정오피스걸()()?Interestingly, there seems to be 합정오피()() p()ttern ()합정오피방()in North Kore()’s use of the terms “w()r” ()nd “pe()ce” ? t합정오피스걸()hey ()re used in t()ndem, ()t ()()합정오피방() roughly 2-to-1 r()tio. In 1998, during ()n e()rlier crisis,합정오피() w()r w()s used o합정오피스걸()n ()ver()ge 1.98 times for every us()ge of pe()ce. In 2()9, the r()tio r()합정오피방()ose slightly to 2.11.()합정오피방() ()nd in 2012, the r()합정오피스걸()tio rose to 2.38, despite rel()tive c()lm for합정오피() most of the ye()r.There h()s ()lso been () not()ble incre()se in ()합정오피방()No합정오피스걸()rth Kore()’s use of “nucle()r” in rhetoric under Kim 엔조이닷컴()Jong Un. Over()ll, references to “nucle()r” h합정오피스걸()()ve grown 350 percent from 합정오피()1998 to 2012, ()nd were up ()nother 139 percent over the first three months of 20합정오피스걸()13 comp()red with the s()me period 엔조이닷컴()in 2012. Me()nwhile,()합정오피방() North Kore()’s use of합정오피()more positive terms such ()s “re합정오피스걸()concili()tion” h()s 합정오피()been inconsistent. Mentions of ()합정오피방()“reconcili()tion” fell between 1998 ()nd 2()9, 합정오피스걸()yet rose between 2()9 ()nd 2012, only()합정오피방() to f()ll ()g()in over the first엔조이닷컴() three months of 2013.North Kore()n rhetoric합정오피스걸() under Kim Jong Il, while cert()inly bellicose, w()s c()lcul()ted, predict()ble, ()nd 합정오피()occ()sion()lly even concil합정오피스걸()i()tory ? First Vice Minister엔조이닷컴()for Foreign ()ff()irs Kim Kye Gw()n ()t one point even ()rgued th()t dism()ntling 합정오피스걸()North Kore()’s nucle()r we()pons without () pe()ce tre()ty would be “unre()son()ble.”합정오피() ()s recently ()s 2()5, Kim합정오피스걸() Jong Il’합정오피()s government t()lked of()합정오피방() the potenti()l for 합정오피()“friendship” between the United St()tes ()nd North 합정오피스걸()Kore(), with Kim Jong Il엔조이닷컴() ()dmitting l()ter th()t he thought ()합정오피방()“f()vor()bly” of the United St()tes.Kim Jong Un, in 합정오피스걸()contr()st, h()s consistently opted for esc()l()tion. Where Kim Jong Il’s ()합정오피방()thre()ts were l()rgely innocuous 합정오피스걸()()nd v()gue, with references to “effective counterme()sures,”합정오피() his son h()s design()ted specific 합정오피스걸()t()rgets or even thre()tened pre-emptive w()r.The big mystery is: why? Kim Jong Il, ()fter ()ll, cle()rly u합정오피스걸()sed hostile엔조이닷컴() rhetoric to extr()ct politic()l합정오피() ()nd m()teri()l concessions ()합정오피방()from the West, such ()s light w()ter re()합정오피스걸()ctors ()nd bil()ter()l t()lks with the United St()tes. Kim Jong Un’s motiv()tions, in contr()st, ()re much less합정오피스걸() cle()r.M()ny ()n()lysts h()ve suggested th()t, ()long ()합정오피방()with the need to conso합정오피()lid()te power domestic()lly, the regime합정오피스걸() is setting the st()ge for future negoti()tions. 엔조이닷컴()Yet Pyongy()ng h()s m()de cle()r th()t its nucle()r we()pons ()re 합정오피스걸()not up for negoti()tion, c()lling them 엔조이닷컴()“the n()tion’s life.” ()nd,()합정오피방() in contr()st with North Kore()’s previous 합정오피스걸()()ppro()ch, Kim Jong Un h()s m()de virtu()lly no dem()nds of the West other th()n h()lfhe()rted ()ppe()ls for () pe()ce 합정오피스걸()tre()ty.The events of recent months, ()합정오피방()including this p()st week’s multiple missile()합정오피방() l()unches, h()ve undersco합정오피스걸()red how different ? ()nd엔조이닷컴() much more provoc()tive 엔조이닷컴()? Kim Jong Un is willing to합정오피() be th()n his f()ther. ()nd the p()t합정오피스걸()tern of the regime’s rhetoric underscores 합정오피()this is not just ()엔조이닷컴() response to developments in the p()st few m합정오피스걸()onths. The question now is()합정오피방() how much further Kim the younger ()합정오피방()is willing to push the envelope.()합정오피방()