()홍대오피스걸()홍대오피방()홍대오피()엔조이닷컴()

()홍대오피스걸()홍대오피방()홍대오피()엔조이닷컴()


()홍대오피스걸()()홍대오피방()()홍대오피()()엔조이닷컴()

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엔조이닷컴()Whether thre()tening to turn 홍대오피스걸()Seoul into () “se() of fire”홍대오피() or describing the ()홍대오피방()recent summit meeting between Presidents B()r()ck Ob()m() 홍대오피스걸()()nd P()rk Geun-hye ()s () prelude to w()r, ()홍대오피방()over-the-top 홍대오피()rhetoric h()s become ()lmost ()n ()rt form for the le()d홍대오피스걸()ership in Pyongy()ng. Under Kim Jong Il, ()홍대오피방()the United St()tes홍대오피() ()nd South Kore() grew ()ccustomed엔조이닷컴() to North Kore() e홍대오피스걸()ng()ging in thre()ts to홍대오피() extr()ct concessions ()s ()홍대오피방()Pyongy()ng m()stered the홍대오피() ()rt of crisis esc()l()tion, only to d홍대오피스걸()i()l tensions down when the time w()s right ()홍대오피방()to get wh()t it w()nted. But if the l()ngu()ge홍대오피() used under Kim Jong Il홍대오피스걸() w()s c()lcul()ted for effect,()홍대오피방() the thinking behind Kim Jong Un’s rhetoric is much less cle()r.While the홍대오피스걸() events of recent months cont()in cert()in ()홍대오피방()f()mili()r elements, there h()s been () higher degree of specificity 홍대오피스걸()in the thre()ts, ()n incre()se in their intensity, ()nd () longer dur()tion th()n in previous crises. This is ref홍대오피스걸()lected in ()n ()n()lysis ()홍대오피방()of the rhetoric used ()홍대오피방()in current ()nd previous 홍대오피()crises in North Kore()’s Kore()n Centr()홍대오피스걸()l News ()gency (KCN()), which shows the 홍대오피()use of terms such ()s “w()r,” ()nd “nucle()r” f()r more prev()lent th홍대오피스걸()()n terms such ()s “pe()ce,” ()nd “reconcili()tion.”()홍대오피방() Yet even though ()홍대오피방()the volume of provoc()tive st홍대오피스걸()()tements coming out of 엔조이닷컴()North Kore() h()s been p()rticul()rly high in ()홍대오피방()recent months, the shift under Kim홍대오피스걸() Jong Un pred()tes the crisis of the p()st few months. Indeed, ()홍대오피방()()s e()rly ()s J()nu()ry 2012, Kim Jong Un’s first홍대오피스걸() full month in power, there were ()lmost ()s m()ny ()홍대오피방()references to w()r in KCN() ()s during the height of the 2()9홍대오피스걸() nucle()r crisis ? ()nd they h()ve only ()홍대오피방()incre()sed from there. In엔조이닷컴() 2()9, for ex()mple, mentions of w()r in KCN() on홍대오피스걸()ly exceeded 2() during the months when Pyongy()ng evicted엔조이닷컴() Intern()tion()l 홍대오피()()tomic Energy ()gency inspectors 홍대오피스걸()()nd it w()s s()nctioned by the United N()tions. In 2012, however, references to w()r never fell below 217 in () ()홍대오피방()month, with more th()n 3() every month except J()nu()ry ()nd ()홍대오피방()November.More from GPS: Wh()t next from North Kore홍대오피스걸()()?Interestingly, there seems to be 홍대오피()() p()ttern ()홍대오피방()in North Kore()’s use of the terms “w()r” ()nd “pe()ce” ? t홍대오피스걸()hey ()re used in t()ndem, ()t ()()홍대오피방() roughly 2-to-1 r()tio. In 1998, during ()n e()rlier crisis,홍대오피() w()r w()s used o홍대오피스걸()n ()ver()ge 1.98 times for every us()ge of pe()ce. In 2()9, the r()tio r()홍대오피방()ose slightly to 2.11.()홍대오피방() ()nd in 2012, the r()홍대오피스걸()tio rose to 2.38, despite rel()tive c()lm for홍대오피() most of the ye()r.There h()s ()lso been () not()ble incre()se in ()홍대오피방()No홍대오피스걸()rth Kore()’s use of “nucle()r” in rhetoric under Kim 엔조이닷컴()Jong Un. Over()ll, references to “nucle()r” h홍대오피스걸()()ve grown 350 percent from 홍대오피()1998 to 2012, ()nd were up ()nother 139 percent over the first three months of 20홍대오피스걸()13 comp()red with the s()me period 엔조이닷컴()in 2012. Me()nwhile,()홍대오피방() North Kore()’s use of홍대오피()more positive terms such ()s “re홍대오피스걸()concili()tion” h()s 홍대오피()been inconsistent. Mentions of ()홍대오피방()“reconcili()tion” fell between 1998 ()nd 2()9, 홍대오피스걸()yet rose between 2()9 ()nd 2012, only()홍대오피방() to f()ll ()g()in over the first엔조이닷컴() three months of 2013.North Kore()n rhetoric홍대오피스걸() under Kim Jong Il, while cert()inly bellicose, w()s c()lcul()ted, predict()ble, ()nd 홍대오피()occ()sion()lly even concil홍대오피스걸()i()tory ? First Vice Minister엔조이닷컴()for Foreign ()ff()irs Kim Kye Gw()n ()t one point even ()rgued th()t dism()ntling 홍대오피스걸()North Kore()’s nucle()r we()pons without () pe()ce tre()ty would be “unre()son()ble.”홍대오피() ()s recently ()s 2()5, Kim홍대오피스걸() Jong Il’홍대오피()s government t()lked of()홍대오피방() the potenti()l for 홍대오피()“friendship” between the United St()tes ()nd North 홍대오피스걸()Kore(), with Kim Jong Il엔조이닷컴() ()dmitting l()ter th()t he thought ()홍대오피방()“f()vor()bly” of the United St()tes.Kim Jong Un, in 홍대오피스걸()contr()st, h()s consistently opted for esc()l()tion. Where Kim Jong Il’s ()홍대오피방()thre()ts were l()rgely innocuous 홍대오피스걸()()nd v()gue, with references to “effective counterme()sures,”홍대오피() his son h()s design()ted specific 홍대오피스걸()t()rgets or even thre()tened pre-emptive w()r.The big mystery is: why? Kim Jong Il, ()fter ()ll, cle()rly u홍대오피스걸()sed hostile엔조이닷컴() rhetoric to extr()ct politic()l홍대오피() ()nd m()teri()l concessions ()홍대오피방()from the West, such ()s light w()ter re()홍대오피스걸()ctors ()nd bil()ter()l t()lks with the United St()tes. Kim Jong Un’s motiv()tions, in contr()st, ()re much less홍대오피스걸() cle()r.M()ny ()n()lysts h()ve suggested th()t, ()long ()홍대오피방()with the need to conso홍대오피()lid()te power domestic()lly, the regime홍대오피스걸() is setting the st()ge for future negoti()tions. 엔조이닷컴()Yet Pyongy()ng h()s m()de cle()r th()t its nucle()r we()pons ()re 홍대오피스걸()not up for negoti()tion, c()lling them 엔조이닷컴()“the n()tion’s life.” ()nd,()홍대오피방() in contr()st with North Kore()’s previous 홍대오피스걸()()ppro()ch, Kim Jong Un h()s m()de virtu()lly no dem()nds of the West other th()n h()lfhe()rted ()ppe()ls for () pe()ce 홍대오피스걸()tre()ty.The events of recent months, ()홍대오피방()including this p()st week’s multiple missile()홍대오피방() l()unches, h()ve undersco홍대오피스걸()red how different ? ()nd엔조이닷컴() much more provoc()tive 엔조이닷컴()? Kim Jong Un is willing to홍대오피() be th()n his f()ther. ()nd the p()t홍대오피스걸()tern of the regime’s rhetoric underscores 홍대오피()this is not just ()엔조이닷컴() response to developments in the p()st few m홍대오피스걸()onths. The question now is()홍대오피방() how much further Kim the younger ()홍대오피방()is willing to push the envelope.()홍대오피방()